Wow! #Biometry! After teaching Math and Science in Kenya for the Peace Corps, I wrote to Sokal and Rohlf at #SUNYStonybrook and went for a visit upon return. I wanted to study there. Sadly, I wasn't accepted. But Columbia accepted me.
Wow! #Biometry! After teaching Math and Science in Kenya for the Peace Corps, I wrote to Sokal and Rohlf at #SUNYStonybrook and went for a visit upon return. I wanted to study there. Sadly, I wasn't accepted. But Columbia accepted me.
Traceability of Quercus petraea and Quercus robur logs: the Biomtrace database was created with the aim of developing algorithms for the biometric traceability of logs, involving artificial intelligence approaches that require large databases.
https://annforsci.biomedcentral.com/articles/10.1186/s13595-025-01276-9
#Forests #AI #Biometry #Wood #Woodtracing
#Epiderminalization:
#Biometry is nothing more than the assumption that the look of someone tells you more truths about him/her/them than the words that come from their mouth. The Skin is more credible than what they say.
#PenisDetectionMachine:
"Gender Recognition by #AI is always built on the premise that someone else can recognize your gender by looking at you."
https://youtu.be/AaU6tI2pb3M
@webhat : Passwordless actually exists on iPhone or iPad under realistic circumstances - that is, not taking into account unlocking the screen (using a PIN, a password or biometrics).
Consider the situation when some stranger borrows your iPhone to make a phone call, or you let your child play a game on your iPad: in such cases they may be able to log in as you onto various websites. That is, without knowing your screen unlock code (or somehow being able to simulate your biometrics).
On specific websites this even also works when using passkeys (no PIN, password or biometrics is required to use the passkey).
It obviously is a vulnerability. But after I filed a bug report in June 2023, Apple denied that it is. And they've not fixed it either.
BTW this works (on iPhone or iPad) in Safari, Firefox, Edge and Chrome (except that in Chrome, "passkey without local auth", only works if, in condition below, only iCloud Keychain is enabled and no other 'optional' password manager - such as KeePassium).
The conditions are:
The password or passkey is stored in iCloud KeyChain;
EITHER: you've NOT configured any biometrics to unlock the screen (meaning that you must use a pincode or a password to unlock the screen - a use case quite common because some people don't like to use, or don't trust, biometrics),
OR: (not common, I found it during testing) 'Settings' > 'Touch ID and Passcode': 'Password Autofill' is OFF;
In 'Settings' > 'Passwords' > 'Password Options' (all quite common):
• 'Autofill Passwords and Passkeys' is ON;
• ' iCloud Keychain' is ON;
• Optionally another password manager is enabled (in my iPhone 'KeePassium' is ON).
Passkeys only: (this is irrelevant for passwords, and applies only to iOS and iPadOS versions that support passkeys): the website you (or the borrower of your iDevice) want to sign in to (using your account) must support "WebAuthn Conditional UI" [1] AND it must specify:
'User Verification': 'Preferred'
(the latter value, stupidly, is the WebAuthn default; the other options are 'Discouraged' and 'Required').
[1] https://github.com/w3c/webauthn/wiki/Explainer:-WebAuthn-Conditional-UI
In short, "WebAuthn Conditional UI" means that the website ALSO accepts a passkey in case you activate (tap in and see a blinking cursor) the user-ID input field (instead of tapping a button labeled e.g. "Sign in using passkey"). Doing that will invoke iCloud KeyChain and lets you select the right passkey.
Two examples (there are more) of such websites (for free testing purposes) are:
• https://passkeys-demo.appspot.com
• https://webauthn.io
AND, NOTABLY, Apple's production SSO site: https:⧸⧸idmsa.apple.com
Note that your browser is redirected to the idmsa site (in order to SSO to Apple) when you open the bugreport that I filed in June 2023:
• https://security.apple.com/signin?path=reports/OE19476493072
Here's the recipe for passwords:
Ensure that conditions
,
and
mentioned above are met;
Open a website where you have an account with it's credentials saved in iCkoud Keychain. Invoke the log in screen and tap into the user-ID field;
Tap the proposed account name. Now iCloud Keychain autofills your user-ID and passwords into the right fields.
And the recipe for passkeys:
Ensure that conditions
,
, and
mentioned above are met;
Open https://security.apple.com/signin?path=reports/OE19476493072
A box pops up from the bottom of the screen. Tap the X at the top-right to close it.
Tap in the input field "Email or Phone Number", then tap your iCloud ID at the bottom of your screen. Now you will be logged in to Apple without using local auth.
Note that you'll probably see a "403 access denied" error, because (although you HAVE logged in) you are not *authorized* to view te bug report.
This is passwordless 1FA because the possession of the (unlocked) device suffices.
Today, #ukelection #ukelection2024
Two posts from elsewhere:
https://www.gov.uk/how-to-vote/photo-id-youll-need
"Worryingly, around 45% of Brits think a polling card is sufficient as ID at the polling station, according to poll for @BylineTimes , even while the polling card itself clearly tells the opposite.
People need to show valid photo ID. Spread the word..."
https://bylinetimes.com/2024/06/17/large-numbers-of-brits-are-still-misinformed-about-voter-id-and-it-could-see-them-blocked-from-the-ballot-box/
(via Josiah Mortimer)
"On BBC Radio Scotland this morning they were discussing people being turned away if they no longer resemble the photo on their ID. It's going to turn nasty tomorrow. It's not practical at all."
Please welcome the common problems of #biometry, which sucks as *any* 100% reliable security mechanism.
Very interesting, palm identification, more reliable then iris identification, not trained on personal but synthetic data, if it works as advertised Amazon has made something great.
https://youtu.be/r_zsS9daZZs?si=jAUduIyffvJMRhqy
#AI #identification #biometry #Amazon
@escamoteur ... but that's not the worst failure of #biometry . The worst is: You have an unlimited amount of passphrases or keys. But each biometric feature only exists once. If stolen/compromised, it cannot be used again or re-created. It's gone. :-)
I may repeat myself over and over again, but even after three (?) decades, #biometry still is wrong. It's not a security-enhancing feature, it's a feature for lazy people who are not interested in security. #toldyouso.
(Danke, Fefe)
https://www.theguardian.com/technology/2023/mar/16/voice-system-used-to-verify-identity-by-centrelink-can-be-fooled-by-ai
Wie interaktive Darstellungen Themen anschaulich illustrieren und wie unfassbar naiv Datenschutz gehandhabt wird... #privacy #biometry
https://interaktiv.br.de/biometrie-afghanistan/
Researchers with the Chaos Computer Club bought items on eBay that turned out to have stored iris scans of 2,632 people, mostly from people living in Iraq and Afghanistan. But also data from members of the U.S. Army:
From the NYT:
"detailed descriptions of individuals in addition to their photograph and biometric data, could be enough to target people who were previously unknown to have worked with U.S. military forces should the information fall into the wrong hands"
NYT has a writeup here: https://www.nytimes.com/2022/12/27/technology/for-sale-on-ebay-a-military-database-of-fingerprints-and-iris-scans.html?unlocked_article_code=AAAAAAAAAAAAAAAACEIPuonUktbfqYhlSlUZBCbJUNMnqBqCgvfeh7I7nDrlJSyYDDFEiukfCpnF8gLIZK5ie9IpznGXTcNIOrY0Sbl1wKpRPkpiRhOwuJqChI9AKiM57IOpX3hzxJnEW6t-8SPvaiPxDtZD84CFnkDMNimsU7rCgTZnfFw79Y1mcln53X1YlLPHErV2xtV_2vs-D814FiNRbHXZ6KXoXxooa9-Wf1qLvFlNLuJcWTzTnNOd6atRM1kBTAKbEw4spDo0-9heO9gIPK3gLBBGecv2hbQZCGwAP57-TtRqBNCSz-M2xOaL_R-cy8O2xeE0FLFXvd7Gu2W9PVUuQNCGLdh1nu1h24vFimy7MldCiUA (the utm ensures you can read the article without subscription)
My former colleagues at BR have been working on this story for many months now. If you understand the German language, I encourage you to listen to their hourlong feature on #biometry https://www.ardaudiothek.de/episode/ard-radiofeature/verraeterische-daten-doku-ueber-die-gefahren-der-biometrie/ard/12204469/ It includes the case of the military database but much more as well